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INTRODUCTION: "PLUS <;A 
CHANGE . . .  ?"t 
Stephen B. Burbank* 
This is a time of self-conscious attention to legal scholarship 
that, although hardly unprecedented, must seem remarkable to 
many in the profession. We hear of "malaise" in the academy, 1 
of the decline of doctrinal scholarship, and more generally, of 
the decline of law as an autonomous discipline.2 For some who 
believe it, the news may be profoundly disturbing, tolling the 
thirteenth hour on entire careers. For others, bearing the 
news-and having it believed-may be essential to launching or 
sustaining careers. 
Most of us, I suspect, are inclined to suspend judgment, in­
ured more than most mortals to the harsh reality that there is 
little new under the sun. This Symposium furnishes additional 
evidence of the wisdom of that posture in the current debates 
about continuity and change in legal scholarship. 
In today's climate, there is irony in a collection of papers that, 
at least as conceived, is devoted to the celebration of "great" law 
review articles. Some may think the entire enterprise perverse or 
at least a wasted grove. Greatness is, after all, contextual, con­
tingent, or in any event in the eye of the beholder. Moreover, if 
it is true that legal scholarship has changed or is rapidly chang­
ing, and given that the articles discussed precede the millenium, 
a collection of value preferences can be of only historical inter­
est-perversity for those with an antiquarian bent. 
One need not, however, reify the concept of greatness to find 
of interest what contemporary scholars find of interest in the 
work of their elders.3 Moreover, history ceases to be merely of 
t © 1988 Stephen B. Burbank, all rights reserved. 
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1968, J.D. 1973, Harvard 
University. 
1. See Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 
647, 647 (1988). 
2. See id. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987). 
3. My apologies to the authors of the works that are celebrated here. If it be any 
comfort, I had originally written "predecessors." 
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historical interest when-which is usually-it tells us something 
relevant to our current situation. 
From a historical perspective, the contributions to this Sym­
posium provide reason to doubt claims that legal scholarship to­
day is vastly different than it was thirty or fifty years ago. Cer­
tainly the essays by Professors Hovenkamp4 and Katz,:' treating 
articles that dealt with public law and private law in 1960 and 
1936 respectively, throw cold water on claims either that eco­
nomic insights have only recently been brought to law or, more 
grandiosely, that law and economics has only recently been rec­
ognized as a discipline. Together, those articles tend to confirm 
Mark Tushnet's recent speculation that "[l]egal scholarship in 
the United States may simply appropriate from other disciplines 
what those disciplines have to offer: institutional economics in 
the 1930's, neo-classical microeconomics today. "6 In addition, 
they may cause us to wonder what happened to the law in law 
and economics. 
By the same token, although by a different route, Professor 
Peller's critique of Herbert Wechsler's neutral principles, as well 
as of the intellectual tradition whence it emanated,7 is more or 
less what we would have expected of a legal realist in the 1930's. 
There is at least one difference, however. Professor Nelson's cau­
tion lest "in responding to ideology, we may become ideologues 
ourselves"8-issued to those concerned about empln­
cism-comes too late for those as profoundly unconcerned about 
facts as are the latter day realists. For both groups, another cau­
tion from the same source bears repetition: "Critical analyses 
that penetrate ideological characterizations of the legal system 
offered by legal elites and powerful interest groups will, by 
themselves, have little effect on general perceptions of law or on 
policy debates concerning legal change."9 
As to "greatness," the skeptical reader will be pleased to find 
that this issue is not a collection of attempts to define that con­
cept in the context of legal literature. It does include, however, 
some substantial attempts to tease out why the articles under 
4. Hovenkamp, Derek Bok and the Merger of Law and Economics, 21 U. MICH. J.L. 
REF. 515 (1988). 
5. Katz, Reflections on Fuller and Perdue's The Reliance Interest in Contract Dam­
ages: A Positive Economic Framework, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 541 (1988). 
6. Tushnet, Legal Scholarship in the United States: An Overview, 50 Mon. L. REv. 
804, 805 (1987). 
7. Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 561 (1988). 
8. Nelson, Ideology, Scholarship, and Sociolegal Change: Lessons from Galanter and 
the "Litigation Crisis," 21 LAw & Soc'v REv. 677, 690-91 (1988). 
9. ld. at 690. 
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discussion have been acclaimed, have had an impact on legal de­
velopment, or have otherwise achieved importance in the eyes of 
the audience to which they were addressed. Some of the authors 
thus also speak indirectly, as Professors Richman and Reynolds 
speak directly/0 to reasons for the opposite phenomena: lack of 
acclaim or impact. The lessons I take away are sobering. 
It comes as no surprise that frequency of citation is a poor 
measure of impact;11 alas, citation may not even guarantee that 
the author has read the cited article. Nor should it be surprising 
that when a prominent author's goal is directly to affect legal 
development and that author offers both a more sophisticated 
analytical framework and simple rules, public authorities should 
find the rules congenial.12 But what are we to make of the ac­
claim greeting an article that, as described in these pages, is 
"highly impressionistic,"13 "bereft of any doctrinal presump­
tion,"14 and "a bit of ft.uff''?11� Putting together Professor Mar­
cus's candid and thorough evaluation of Abram Chayes's work16 
with Professor Neuman's wonderful evaluation of Henry 
Monaghan's "backfires,"17 one might conclude that the surest 
route to acclaim or recognition is to avoid ambiguity, subtlety, 
rough edges-to avoid, that is, what for many of us distinguishes 
scholarship from journalism. That would, I think, miss a critical 
distinction that has to do with audience. 
Chayes's article, according to Professor Marcus, has had no 
discernible impact in the courts, probably because it was reso­
lutely adoctrinal.18 Monaghan's articles had effects in the court 
that counts, albeit not those he intended, because they were doc­
trinal and because the author discussed alternative approaches 
that could be appropriated without the author's qualifications, 
including qualifications the author did not think it necessary to 
develop.19 
Simple rules, paradigms, or analytical frameworks need not be 
simplistic, but they are at risk of simplification. They also invite 
10. Richman & Reynolds, Appellate Justice Bureaucracy and Scholarship, 21 U. 
MICH. J.L. REF. 623 (1988). 
11. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 655. 
12. See Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 517 . At the time (1960), the "prominence" of 
the author (Derek Bok) arose from two facts: He was a member of the Harvard Law 
School faculty, and he was publishing in the Harvard Law Review. 
13. Marcus, supra note 1, at 652. 
14. !d. at 691; see also id. at 652 ("almost bereft of trad itional doctrinal analysis"). 
15. !d. at 691. 
16. !d. passim. 
17. Neuman, Law Review Articles That Backfire, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 697 (1988). 
18. Marcus, supra note 1, at 648. 
19. See Neuman, supra note 17, at 718-20. 
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refinement and elaboration and may, as Professor Marcus de­
scribes20 and Professor Katz demonstrates,21 have considerable 
generative force. But that is not, at least today, the work of 
courts. In appropriating as well as in rejecting the fruits of 
scholarship, judges are guided by what "fill[s] the[ir] needs."22 A 
scholar whose rules, paradigms, or analytical frameworks are not 
simple and who aspires to do more than titillate his colleagues 
should consider moonlighting as a journalise3 or, as the contri­
bution by Dean Hoeflich and Mr. Perelmuter may suggest,24 be­
coming the author of a casebook. 
For me, in other words, the contributions to this Symposium 
both illustrate a tension inherent in the work of legal scholarship 
and demonstrate that it has long been with us. That tension, 
explored by Professor Kronman,26 arises from our training as, 
and our training of, advocates on the one hand and our aspira­
tion to seek knowledge and (dare I say it) truth on the other. 
Moreover, I see in the reaching out to other disciplines not sim­
ply, and not primarily, the desire to "legitimate . . .  the legal 
academy as a place properly attached to a university and not 
just a professional training ground,"26 but a search for help in 
mediating that tension. Finally, in both Professor Hovenkamp's 
and Professor Marcus's contributions, I find (perhaps because I 
was looking for it) confirmation that what may be the greatest 
source of help remains largely untapped-empiricism. 27 As to 
that, most of us are prisoners of our educations. If that were not 
enough, the mishaps of the realists provide a healthy deterrent. 
And then there is the work involved. Life is so much easier in an 
air-conditioned office, or at worst a library (with janitors and re-
20. Marcus, supra note 1, passim. 
21. Katz, supra note 5, passim. 
22. Richman & Reynolds, supra note 10, at 646. 
23. See Burbank, Tolling the Statute in a Federal Case, Nat'! L.J., Sept. 14, 1987, at 
19. 
24. Hoeflich & Perelmuter, The Anatomy of a Leading Case: Lawrence v. Fox in the 
Courts, the Casebooks, and the Commentaries, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 721 (1988). 
25. Kronman, Foreword: Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J. 955 
(1981). 
26. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 817. 
27. See Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 539; Marcus, supra note 1, at 691-94. After 
writing this Introduction, but before it went to the printer, I came across a very interest­
ing article that explores this possibility in depth: Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of 
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search assistants).28 Up may be down in the untidy world 
outside,29 but, by God, we know where our navels are. 
There is hope. Fifteen years ago, Marc Galanter could not 
place in a law review an article that, as we now know, could 
comfortably have been the subject of commentary in this issue. 30 
One of the letters of rejection (from Yale Law Journal editor 
Robert B. Reich) observed: 
We have found your general analysis of legal systems, 
and the parts played therein by "RPs" [repeat players] 
and "OSs" [one shotters] to be both fascinating and well 
written. But does the model conform to empirical study, 
or even to what we can observe about the legal system? 
Since the demise of the Hughes, and Vinson courts, the 
legal system has proven itself more sensitive to the de­
mands for legal change from minority interests than any 
other branch of our government. The liberal use of class 
actions, amicus briefs, and advocacy groups has given rise 
to a constant reformist pressure toward rule changes 
which favor the "have nots." The great irony of our time 
may be, as Skelly Wright contends, that the "haves," in­
cluding large institutions, are taking refuge in our more 
political "representative" forums, while individualized 
and autonomous interests in our society have increasingly 
come to look to courts for the protection and articulation 
of their own goals. 31 
Great ironies are also in the eye of the beholder. Marc Ga­
lanter no longer has such trouble in placing his work in law re­
views, 32 and he and his colleagues are now taken seriously 
28. See Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REv. 763, 774-75 
(1986). 
29. See Shapiro, The Death of the Up-Down Distinction, 36 STAN. L. REv. 465 
(1984). 
30. Galanter, Why the "Haues" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REv. 95 (1974). 
31. Letter from Robert B. Reich to Marc Galanter (May 9, 1972) (copy on file with U. 
MICH. J.L. REF.). For a brief account of Galanter's travail in having this article published, 
see This Week's Citation Classic, 5 CuRRENT CoNTENTS: Soc. & BEHAVIORAL Sci. 24 
(1983). 
32. See, e.g., Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and 
Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious 
Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4 (1983). 
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enough to be publicly dismissed by a Chief Justice of the United 
States. 33 That is progress. 
33. See W. Burger, Opening Remarks at 63rd Annual Meeting of the American Law 
Institute (May 13, 1986), reprinted in 63 A.L.I. PROC. 32, 34 (1987). But see Galanter, 
Chief Justice Burger: Review the Facts, Legal Times, Sept. 29, 1986, at 14. 
l 
I 
I 
I 
l 
l 
j 
l 
